

Message Text

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PAGE 01 BONN 06029 01 OF 02 060917Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----060919Z 080777 /12

P R 060858Z APR 77
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7198
USMISSION USBERLIN
INFO AMEMBASSY BERLIN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 06029

STADIS//////////

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PFOR PGOV WB US UK FR GW GE UR
SUBJECT: ALLIED RESPONSE TO GDR MEASURES IN BERLIN

REFS: (A) BONN 5777; (B) USBER 873; (C) STATE 67315;
(D) BONN 5068; (E) MOSCOW 3087; (F) STATE 40753;
(G) USBER 456; (H) BONN A-38; (I) USBER 263;
(J) BERLIN 5217; (K) BONN 932; (L) USBER 635 NOTAL

BEGIN SUMMARY. GIVEN THE POSSIBILITY OF ADDITIONAL
SOVIET/GDR MEASURES AFFECTING THE STATUS OF BERLIN, WE
AGREE WITH MISSION BERLIN THAT WE SHOULD BE THINKING
ABOUT WHERE WE WILL DRAW THE LINE AND WHAT WE WILL DO IF
THAT LINE IS CROSSED. AS A TACTICAL MATTER WE DOUBT
THAT OUR BONN GROUP ALLIES WOULD BE RECEPTIVE TO A
PROPOSAL FOR A FORMAL CONTINGENCY STUDY AT THIS
JUNCTURE. THE BONN GROUP WILL PRESUMABLY BE ASKED,
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HOWEVER, TO PREPARE A BERLIN ASSESSMENT FOR THE MAY
QUADRIPARTITE MEETINGS, AND THIS WOULD BE A LOGICAL
VEHICLE FOR SEEKING A CONSENSUS AMONG THE ALLIES AND
THE FRG ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE RECENT MEASURES
AFFECTING BERLIN. AT THE SAME TIME, IT WOULD BE
USEFUL FOR THE US TO UNDERTAKE INTERNAL STUDIES ON WHAT
ACTION THE US WOULD BE PREPARED TO TAKE IF OUR PRESENT

EFFORTS AT DETERRENCE SHOULD FAIL AND THE SOVIETS AND THE GDR SHOULD ATTEMPT TO INTERFERE WITH ALLIED ACCESS TO EAST BERLIN. ACTION REQUESTED: (A) DEPARTMENT'S REACTION TO THE SUGGESTION FOR INTERNAL US CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND (B) DEPARTMENT'S VIEWS ON PREPARATIONS EXPECTED OF THE BONN GROUP, IN PARTICULAR WITH REGARD TO AN ASSESSMENT, FOR THE MAY QUADRIPARTITE MEETINGS. END SUMMARY.

1. LACKING CLEAR EVIDENCE ON WHY THE SOVIETS IN RECENT MONTHS HAVE PERMITTED THE GDR TO MOVE A FEW STEPS CLOSER TO ITS GOAL OF FULL SOVEREIGNTY OVER EAST BERLIN, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO CONCLUDE THAT NO FURTHER ACTION IS IN STORE. MISSION BERLIN HAS POINTED OUT THAT CERTAIN DANGER SIGNALS EXIST (REF B).

2. IN ITS ANALYSIS OF WHAT HAS TRANSPIRED THUS FAR IN BERLIN (REF F), THE DEPARTMENT NOTED THAT THE QUESTION IS BASICALLY ONE OF WHETHER THE SOVIETS FIND IT OPPORTUNE OR NECESSARY AT ANY GIVEN TIME TO PERMIT THE GDR TO TAKE ADDITIONAL MEASURES AFFECTING THE STATUS OF BERLIN. IN ADDITION TO THE CONDITIONS NOTED BY THE DEPARTMENT AS BEING MOST LIKELY TO STIMULATE ACTIONS OF THE SORT RECENTLY TAKEN, EMBASSY MOSCOW HAS SUGGESTED (REF E) THAT AT LEAST SOME OF THE RECENT MEASURES MAY HAVE BEEN IN RETALIATION FOR ALLIED DECISIONS CONCERNING BERLIN'S RELATIONSHIP THE EC.

3. MOSCOW NOTES THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE CEASED TALKING
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ABOUT THE EC CONNECTION IN OPEN POLEMICS. IT MAY BE, THEREFORE, THAT, HAVING TAKEN CONCRETE STEPS TO SHOW THEIR DISPLEASURE, THE SOVIETS HAVE GIVEN UP THE FIGHT TO INFLUENCE ALLIED DECISIONS ON EC MATTERS. BUT WE ARE ABOUT TO DELIVER A NEW NOTE ON THE SUBJECT WHICH THE SOVIETS WILL FIND UNSATISFACTORY, AND FRG LEGISLATION ON DIRECT ELECTIONS TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT -- WHICH WILL CONFIRM THAT BERLIN IS TO SEND THREE INDIRECTLY-CHOSEN REPRESENTATIVES TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT -- WILL BE PRESENTED TO THE BUNDESTAG THIS MONTH. IF RETALIATION IS A MAJOR SOVIET MOTIVE, THERE MAY THUS BE MORE OCCASIONS FOR THEM TO ACT.

4. US REACTIONS TO RECENT EVENTS HAVE THUS FAR INVOLVED TWO COURSES OF ACTION: DEMONSTRATING TO THE GDR, THROUGH SPECIFIC MEASURES INCLUDING THE POSTPONEMENT OF HIGH-LEVEL VISITS, THAT THE ACTIONS THEY HAVE TAKEN

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----060923Z 080807 /12

P R 060858Z APR 77
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7199
USMISSION USBERLIN
INFO AMEMBASSY BERLIN
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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 BONN 06029

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HINDER THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS, AND
WARNING THE SOVIETS AT HIGH LEVELS OF THE ROLE OF
BERLIN IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS AND IN EAST-WEST
RELATIONS IN GENERAL. THESE ACTIONS, WHICH HAVE BEEN
AIMED PRIMARILY AT DETERRENCE, SHOULD BE CONTINUED AS
OPPORTUNITIES ARISE. ONLY TIME WILL TELL HOW EFFECTIVE
THEY ARE.

5. WE ARE IN BASIC AGREEMENT WITH THE SUGGESTION OF
MISSION BERLIN (REF B) THAT WE SHOULD MEANWHILE BE
CONSIDERING THE QUESTION OF WHAT TO DO IF DETERRENCE
FAILS. OUR READING OF THE ATTITUDES OF THE OTHER
MEMBERS OF THE BONN GROUP, HOWEVER, IS THAT WE WOULD
NOT FIND THEM RECEPTIVE TO A PROPOSAL FOR A FORMAL
CONTINGENCY STUDY, IN THE ABSENCE OF CLEARER EVIDENCE
OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF DRASTIC MOVES IN BERLIN SUCH AS
INTERFERENCE WITH ALLIED ACCESS TO EAST BERLIN.

6. THERE MAY BE LESS FORMAL WAYS OF GETTING AT THE
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PROBLEM. ALTHOUGH ALL BONN GROUP REPRESENTATIVES ARE AWAITING GUIDANCE FROM CAPITALS AS TO WHAT FORM THE MAY QUADRIpartite MEETINGS WILL TAKE AND WHAT PREPARATIONS WILL BE EXPECTED OF THE BONN GROUP, IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT THERE WILL AGAIN BE A DESIRE FOR AN ASSESSMENT. IF SO, THAT MIGHT BE THE BEST VEHICLE FOR SEEKING A CONSENSUS ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE RECENT ACTIONS IN BERLIN AND ON POSSIBLE ALLIED COURSES OF ACTION FOR THE FUTURE.

7. WE ARE NOT CERTAIN THAT WE CAN ACHIEVE AGREEMENT IN THE ASSESSMENT, OR IN ANY OTHER WRITTEN STUDY, ON WHERE THE LINE IS TO BE DRAWN AGAINST FUTURE ENCROACHMENTS ON THE STATUS OF BERLIN. WE SUSPECT, HOWEVER, THAT THERE IS ALREADY UNSPOKEN AGREEMENT THAT THAT LINE CONSISTS OF AN ATTEMPT TO BLOCK ALLIED ACCESS TO EAST BERLIN. WE FURTHER SUSPECT THAT, IF THAT LINE IS CROSSED, ALLIED REACTIONS WILL BY AND LARGE BE DETERMINED BY THE VIGOR WITH WHICH THE US IS WILLING TO REACT. FOR THAT REASON, RATHER THAN SEEK A NEW BONN GROUP CONTINGENCY ACTION PROGRAM AT THE PRESENT TIME, WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE FOR THE US TO UNDERTAKE SERIOUS INTERNAL STUDIES ON WHAT WE WOULD DO IF WE SUDDENLY FOUND OUR PATROLS BLOCKED FROM ENTERING AT CHECKPOINT CHARLIE. IN A CRUNCH, WE WOULD HOPE THE BRITISH AND FRENCH WOULD FOLLOW OUR LEAD. USBER HAS BEGUN SUCH PLANNING WITH A REVIEW OF BQD-CC-24 (REF L), AND WE BELIEVE THAT REVIEW SHOULD BE EXAMINED ALSO HERE AND IN THE DEPARTMENT.

8. USBER HAS ALSO SUGGESTED (PARA 5, REF B) THAT WE MAY SEE "MORE OF THE SAME" BEFORE WE REACH THE POINT OF INTERFERENCE WITH ALLIED ACCESS TO EAST BERLIN. WE DO NOT EXCLUDE THIS POSSIBILITY, BUT THE DIFFICULTY IS IN KNOWING WHAT "MORE OF THE SAME" MIGHT CONSIST OF. THE LVERORDNUNGSBLATT WAS QUITE LOW UNTIL IT HAD DISAPPEARED,

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AND EVEN THEN IT WAS SOME MONTHS BEFORE WE MISSED IT. NOR HAD ANYONE FOCUSED ON THE FACT THAT THE GDR STREET USAGE TAX DID NOT APPLY TO EAST BERLIN UNTIL IT WAS RECENTLY EXTENDED THERE. IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT THERE ARE OTHER DISTINCTIONS OF THIS NATURE WHICH THE GDR HAS IN MIND REMOVING. USBER GAVE A PRELIMINARY RESPONSE IN REF I (PARAS 6 AND 7) TO THE QUESTION WHICH GREW OUT OF A JANUARY BONN GROUP DISCUSSION (REF K) ON HOW MUCH OF THE LOAF OF SALAMI IS LEFT. WE SUGGEST THAT ANOTHER USEFUL PART OF CONTINGENCY PLANNING WOULD BE FOR THE MISSIONS IN BERLIN TO ATTEMPT A MORE

COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF THE REMAINING DISTINCTIONS
WHICH DEMONSTRATE THAT EAST BERLIN IS NOT YET FULLY
INTEGRATED INTO THE GDR.

9. ACTION REQUESTED:

(A) DEPARTMENT'S AND USBER'S REACTIONS TO THE
SUGGESTIONS IN PARAS 6, 7 AND 8 ABOVE; AND

(B) URGENT GUIDANCE FROM THE DEPARTMENT ON
PREPARATIONS DESIRED OF THE BONN GROUP FOR THE MAY
QUADRIPARTITE MEETINGS.
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Message Attributes

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